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FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION:
POWER TO THE PEOPLE
MAJORITY RULE
His party was the Brotherhood of Brothers,
and there were more of them than of the others.
That is, they constituted that minority
which formed the greater part of the majority.
Within the party, he was of the faction
that was supported by the greater fraction.
And in each group, within each group, he sought
the group that could command the most support.
The final group had finally elected
a triumvirate whom they all respected.
Now of these three, two had the final word
because the two could overrule the third.
One of these two was relatively weak,
so one alone stood at the final peak.
He was THE GREATER NUMBER of the pair
which formed the most part of the three that were
elected by the most of those whose boast
it was to represent the most of most of most
of most of the entire state-
or of the most of it at any rate.
He never gave himself a moment's slumber
but sought the welfare of the greatest number.
And all the people, everywhere they went,
knew to their cost exactly what it meant
to be dictated to by the majority.
But that meant nothing-they were the minority.'
Many factors affect the outcome of an election, but few have a
greater impact upon the result than the rules of voting and of counting
the votes.2 Because the method of voting and vote tallying is the
mechanism for recording the voters' reactions to important political
1. PIET HIN, GRooKs 22 (1966). Published by Doubleday & Co., Inc., copy-
right 1966, Aspila. Used by permission of the author.
2. For a discussion of the terms "rules of voting" and "counting the votes", see
note 8 infra.
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issues, it is imperative that it be as accurate, as reliable, and as im-
partial as possible.3
Beginning with the 1962 decision of Baker v. Carr,4 the United
States Supreme Court has struggled through a judicial review of our
elective processes. Acknowledging the importance of an accurate re-
flection of the electorate in the governing body, the Court, in the land-
mark case of Reynolds v. Sims,5 declared that the basic goal of ap-
portionment must be fair and effective representation. 6 This objective
was translated into a one person-one vote standard for judging the con-
stitutional validity of election schemes. However, not only does the
one person-one vote standard fail to ensure fair and effective repre-
sentation, but the formula's deceptive simplicity "has kept the Court
on a rough road that has run downhill but in the wrong direction
. . . [and] has now come to a dead end."'
This note will first review the Supreme Court decisions which de-
velop and apply the one person-one vote standard in the congressional,
state legislative, and local governmental reapportionment cases. The
discussion will then analyze three specific problems in these decisions:
first, the Court's characterization of these cases as civil rights cases;
second, the inconsistent application and multiple meanings of the one
person-one vote formula; and third, the Court's failure to realize that
one person-one vote is little more than an unrealistic clich6. This note
will then argue the merits of using fair and effective representation it-
self as the constitutional standard for reviewing election schemes.
After demonstrating the unconstitutionality of bloc voting and plurality
voting,' the two electoral systems used almost exclusively in this coun-
3. Ross, Preface to E. LAKEMAN & J. LAMBERT, VOTING IN DEMocRAcIES 9
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Ross].
4. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Baker held that reapportionment suits are not barred
by the impediments of standing, federal court jurisdiction, or justiciability. The Court
has also indicated that these procedural doctrines will not bar racial or partisan gerry-
mandering suits. See, e.g., Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965); Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960). These cases strongly suggest that the direct
constitutional attack upon bloc voting and plurality voting advocated in this note could
not be dismissed on these procedural grounds. For an in-depth discussion of the justi-
ciability issue, see McKay, Reapportionment and Local Government, 36 Gno. WAsH.
L. REv. 713, 719-20 (1968); Editorial Note, Political Gerrymandering: The Law and
Politics of Partisan Districting, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 144, 150-55 (1967); Note,
Wesberry v. Sanders: Deep in the Thicket, 32 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1076, 1077-91 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Deep in the Thicket].
5. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
6. Id. at 565-66.
7. Clark, Introduction to Symposium-One Man-One Vote and Local Govern-
ment, 36 Gno. WAsH. L. Rnv. 689, 691 (1968).
8. Each electoral system is defined by its rules of voting and of vote tallying.
In the bloc voting system the voter is instructed to designate as many candidates as
there are seats open; each mark is assigned a value of "1." The marks for each candi-
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try, the discussion will conclude by suggesting an alternative to these
first-past-the-post systems'-preferential proportional representation
with fractional transfer of surplus votes, a sophisticated electoral sys-
tem which does ensure fair and effective representation.
Two Semantic Problems
Before confronting the Supreme Court's decisions, it is necessary
to consider two difficulties in terminology which have complicated
resolution of the reapportionment issue. First, many commentators
and lower courts, as well as the Supreme Court, have utilized the la-
bels "multi-member districts"'10 and "single-member districts" to refer
to bloc voting and plurality electoral systems, respectively. However,
the terms are not synonymous. Bloc voting and plurality voting are,
respectively, the multi-member and single-member forms of the first-
past-the-post class of systems." Technically, a multi-member district
is a finite geographical area from which more than one seat is filled in
each election; in a single-member district, only one seat is open for
election from the area each time.
Secondly, in Reynolds v. Sims,'2 the Supreme Court formulated
the constitutional "right of a citizen to equal representation and to have
his vote weighted equally with those of all other citizens in the elec-
tion. . . ."' Although the Court has often employed the terminology
"equal representation,"' 4 this is a gross misnomer, there is simply no
date are counted, and the candidates accruing the greatest number of votes are declared
elected. If there is only one seat open, the system is called plurality voting.
For convenient reference, electoral systems may be grouped into one of three
classes, depending upon the system's accuracy in reflecting the composition of the elec-
torate in the governing body. The least accurate class of electoral systems is aptly la-
belled first-past-the-post and includes both the bloc voting and the plurality voting elec-
toral systems. The most accurate systems are in a class designated as proportional
representation (P.R.). Single transferable vote (S.T.V.) and preferential proportional
representation with fractional transfer of surplus votes (P.P.R.), the system advocated
in this note, are both examples of proportional representation. The third class contains
the systems of intermediate accuracy such as cumulative voting and limited voting. For
an in-depth, socio-political analysis of these electoral systems (excluding P.P.R., which
is of recent origin), see Ross, supra note 3.
9. See note 8 supra.
10. To avoid confusion, this note will use "multi-member district" in referring to
the improper usage of the term, i.e. meaning bloc voting, and multi-member district,
i.e. no quotation marks, in referring to the proper meaning. Similarly, "single-member
district" refers to plurality voting and single-member district to the technical definition.
11. See note 8 supra.
12. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
13. Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
14. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969); Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
(Vol. 26
September 1974J FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 193
such thing. 5 However, a reading of Reynolds and the succeeding
reapportionment cases makes it clear that the Court is using "equal
representation" interchangeably with fair and effective representation. 6
The Supreme Court Decisions: Review and Critique
Most frequently labelled "one person-one vote," "one man, one
vote," or "equal representation for equal numbers,"' 7 the standard
which the Supreme Court has developed in the reapportionment cases
requires that each state make "an honest and good faith effort to con-
struct districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable."' 8
Unfortunately, the articulation and application of this standard fhave
resulted in a series of inconsistent and internally confusing decisions.
This section will explore both the Court's interpretation of the one
person-one vote standard and its application to the three distinct lines
of reapportionment cases-the congressional cases, the state legislative
cases, and the local governmental cases.
Congressional Apportionment
The one person-one vote concept on the congressional districting
level was derived from article I, section 2 of the federal Constitution.
In a 1964 decision, Wesberry v. Sanders,'9 the Supreme Court first in-
terpreted the section's provision that representatives be chosen "by the
People of the several States" to mean that one person's vote in a con-
gressional election must be worth as much as another's "as nearly as
is practicable."20 "To say that a vote is worth more in one district than
in another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of dem-
ocratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Rep-
resentatives elected 'by the People'....
In several subsequent decisions, the Court refined the rules of
one person-one vote as they applied to congressional elections. In one
of these cases, Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,22 Missouri's reapportionment
scheme was invalidated. The largest district was overrepresented by
3.13 percent from the ideal, and the smallest was underrepresented by
15. See Deep in the Thicket, supra note 4, at 1114. In order for everyone to
have "equal representation" an electoral system would have to waste no votes at all;
i.e. everyone must elect a candidate of his choice.
16. See id.
17. See note 14 supra.
18. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
19. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
20. Id. at 7-8.
21. Id. at 8.
22. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
2.84 percent.23 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, declared
that the "as nearly as practicable" standard required
that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathe-
matical equality. Unless population variances among congres-
sional districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the
State must justify each variance, no matter how small.
[T]he command of Art. 1, § 2, that States create congres-
sional districts which provide equal representation for equal num-
bers of people permits only the limited population variances which
are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute
equality, or for which justification is shown.24
Texas' congressional plan was the most recent victim of the Wes-
berry and Kirkpatrick rationale. In White v. Weiser,25 a 1973 de-
cision, the Supreme Court invalidated a scheme with a total deviation
of 4.13 percent from the mathematical equal population ideal, and a
ratio of 1.04 to 1 between the largest and smallest districts.
State Legislative Apportionment
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
been the touchstone in evaluating both state and local governmental
districting plans.2 6  In the 1964 decision of Reynolds v. Sims,2 7 the
Supreme Court declared:
23. Id. at 528. The Court has utilized two types of statistics in measuring the
constitutional validity of a districting system. In one type the number of residents
in the largest or smallest district is compared to the ideal of exact equality, and the
figure is expressed as a percentage deviation. Sometimes the percentages for the largest
and the smallest districts are added together to obtain the total deviation. E.g., White
v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 785 (1973). The second formula utilizes a ratio to express
the difference between the populations of the largest and smallest districts. E.g.,
Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 442 (1967).
24. 394 U.S. at 530-31 (citation omitted). In Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542
(1969), decided on the same day as Kirkpatrick, the Court struck down New York's
congressional plan under the authority of Kirkpatrick. The scheme divided the state
into several large districts, which were then subdivided into districts of equal popula-
tion.
25. 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
26. However, the Court's reliance on the equal protection clause and its corres-
ponding rejection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the guar-
antee clause of article IV, section 4, have been criticized as "not responsive to large
questions concerning the structure of government-which is what reapportionment in-
volves ultimately .... ." Dixon, Reapportionment Perspectives: What is Fair Repre-
sentation?, 51 A.B.A.J. 319 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Dixon]. Professor Dixon
most favors the guarantee clause: "The guarantee of 'republican form of government'
clause of the Federal Constitution is responsive to the difficult issue of indirect de-
mocracy and fair representation with which the Western world has been grappling ever
since it abandoned the direct, or referendum, democracy of the ancient Greeks. The
due process clause would also be responsive to the complexity of the representation is-
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Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citi-
zens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment [it
must follow] that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the op-
portunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of
state legislators. Diluting the weight of votes because of place of
residence impairs basic constitutional rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment just as much as invidious discrimination based upon
factors such as race .... 28
This conclusion was derived from three principles: first, that the
right to vote is a basic civil right of man;29 second, that any restrictions
upon the right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice strike
at the heart of representative government;30 and third, that "the right
of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of
a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free
exercise of the franchise."3'
One year later, the Supreme Court was presented with its first
opportunity to apply the Reynolds' principles. In Fortson v. Dorsey,3 2
sue, because of its focus on over-all fairness and reasonableness. Either would be an
adequate safeguard for preservation of what Justice Stewart referred to in his Maryland
opinion as 'ultimate effective majority rule.' Either would be responsive also to the
issue of adequate representation of minority interests and to the correlative issue of
gerrymandering to maximize the voting strength of one group of partisans." Id. Pro-
fessor Dixon has also expressed his feeling that "[e]ven the Supreme Court's selection
of the equal protection clause as the instrument for political revolution in apportion-
ment and districting practices would not have been so unsettling to the cause of politi-
cal realism if the Court had taken the same flexible approach to equal protection when
applied to reapportionment as it had taken when applying this clause to almost all is-
sues other than racial equality. . . . In these cases equal protection emerges as an em-
pirical rule of reasonableness, a rule of fairness in the methods used to achieve a legi-
timate end." Id.
27. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
28. Id. at 565-66.
29. Id. at 561.
30. Id. at 555, 562.
31. Id. at 555. The Court concluded that the members of both houses of a state
legislature must be elected from equal-population districts. Although they realized that
"[miathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional require-
ment", 377 U.S. at 577, nevertheless, "the overriding objective must be [the] substantial
equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is
approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State." Id. at 579.
Reynolds itself held Alabama's apportionment scheme unconstitutional. In the
five companion cases, the Court invalidated the apportionment plans of several other
states: WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York); Maryland Comm.
v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (Maryland); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964)
(Virginia); Roman v. Sinnock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (Delaware); Lucas v. Forty-
Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (Colorado). In the Lucas case, the ap-
portionment plan had been approved by the state's voters by a margin of 2-1; however,
the district population ratios of 1.7 to 1 and 3.6 to 1 for the House and Senate, re-
spectively, did not meet the one person-one vote test of Reynolds.
32. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
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an attack upon a mixed "multi-member" and "single-member" district-
ing system,33 Justice Brennan upheld the mixed scheme and rejected
the plaintiffs' contention that the Constitution permitted only "single-
member districts."34  However, in concluding that the "multi-mem-
ber districts" were not unconstitutional per se, the Court refused to
recognize the fact that, just as "separate but equal" facilities are in-
herently unequal,3 5 voters in the "single-member districts" are deprived
of their fair and effective representation. 6
In Swann v. Adams37 and Kilgarlin v. Hill,3" two 1967 cases,
the Court considered the limit of permissible deviation from absolute
equality. Swann invalidated Florida's apportionment plan with ratios
of 1.30 to 1 and 1.41 to 1 in the Senate and House respectively; in
Kilgarlin a ratio of 1.31 to 1 of the largest to the smallest districts in
Texas was held to be a violation of one person-one vote. These
cases formulated a new rule: to avoid constitutional infirmity, a state
must show that its plan suffers only from de minimus population var-
33. In a mixed districting system, the geographical electoral unit (city, state, etc.)
contains some "multi-member districts" and some "single-member districts".
34. The Court reserved the question of the constitutionality of "multi-member
districts" in circumstances where they were shown to "operate to minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." 379
U.S. at 439. In Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), Justice Brennan spelled out
three special situations in which the requisite discrimination might be shown: if the
"districts are large in relation to the total number of legislators, if districts are not ap-
propriately subdistricted to assure distribution of legislators that are resident over the
entire district, or if such districts characterize both houses of a bicameral legislature
rather than one." Id. at 88.
35. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. In fact, employing mathematical principles, it has been proven that there is
a great difference in the voting power of the residents of different-sized districts, even
if the districts are allotted "proportionate" numbers of representatives. This is true be-
cause a voter's ability to affect the outcome of an election does not vary as the simple
inverse of the districts' populations. For example, suppose state X is apportioned into
districts A and B. District A contains 400 residents and is given 4 representatives,
elected from this "multi-member district"; district B has only 100 persons and is permit-
ted to elect one representative. On the surface, it would seem that the voters in these
two districts were given equal representation. However, Professor Banzhaf has shown
that, in reality, the voter's ability to elect his representative is not the inverse of the
district's population, but rather the inverse of the square root of the district's popula-
tion. In the example above, this would be 4/V 400, or 4/20 (or 2/10) and 1/V 100,
or 1/10, for districts A and B respectively. Thus, the ability of the voters in district
A to affect the outcome of the election is twice as great (2/10 compared to 1/10)
as in district B. Banzhaf, One Man, ? Votes: Mathematical Analysis of Voting Power
and Effective Representation, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 808, 819 (1968); Banzhaf, Multi-
Member Electoral Districts-Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75
YALE L.J. 1309, 1323 (1966).
37. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
38. 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
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lances; if greater than de minimus, a state must justify any deviation.8
In 1971 the reapportionment litigants renewed their fight against
mixed districting schemes. In Whitcomb v. Chavis,4 -the Court re-
jected the two-pronged attack of the black residents of a ghetto in the
"multi-member district" of Marion County, Indiana. The petitioners
argued, first, that their votes were worth less than the votes of "single-
member district" residents,4 and second, that if their large district was
equitably divided, the ghetto residents possessed sufficient strength to
elect two representatives and one senator. The Supreme Court de-
cided that overrepresentation 42 had not been proven and that the
blacks' failure to elect representatives in proportion to their popula-
tion "emerges more as a function of losing elections than of built-in
bias against poor Negroes. 43
The Court's uncertainty as to the best method of handling election
cases was apparent in a series of 1973 cases. The retreat from their
emphasis on strict equality in state legislative districting was first evi-
dent in Mahan v. Howell,44 in which Virginia's apportionment plan,
with districts drawn substantially to maintain the existing political
boundaries, was upheld. This scheme had created districts with a devi-
ation of 16.4 percent from the ideal4 5 but with a ratio of only 1.18 ,to
1. The issue, said Justice Rehnquist, was whether -the equal protection
clause permitted only population variances which were unavoidable
39. 385 U.S. at 444-45; 386 U.S. at 122-24.
40. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
41. A major problem in the mixed districting area is the double-headed argument
with respect to under- or overrepresentation of voters in "multi-member districts" as
compared to "single-member districts." For the argument that the "multi-member dis-
trict" voters are overrepresented, see note 36 supra. The reverse may also be proven
mathematically. Suppose districts A and B contain 400 and 100 voters, respectively,
and are therefore allotted 4 and 1 representatives, respectively. Whereas a voter in
district A is only 1 out of 400 voters, a voter in district B is 1 out of 100 voters.
Hence, a district A voter can argue that he has a lesser chance of affecting the outcome
of the election.
42. Overrepresentation and underrepresentation describe situations in which dis-
tricts have, respectively, more or less than the "equal representation" to which they are
entitled.
43. 403 U.S. at 153. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Whitcomb, pointed out several
inconsistencies in the Court's reapportionment decisions, including the statement in
Whitcomb that the three-judge district court had "misconceived" the equal protection
clause. The lower court had struck down the apportionment scheme because, under
the circumstances of the case, it minimized or cancelled out the voting strength of a
racial element of the voting population-precisely the finding requisite to a declaration
of unconstitutionality required by Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), and Bums
v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
44. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
45. For definition of "ideal", see note 23 supra.
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despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality.4" Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that, because Reynolds v. Sims47 permitted more
flexibility in the realm of state legislative districting than in congres-
sional districting,48 some deviation from equality is permissible if based
upon " 'legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a ra-
tional state policy.' ",4' Therefore, he concluded that the proper stan-
dard for measuring the validity of a state's justification is "rational
consideration," not "governmental necessity."50
Connecticut's apportionment plan, which was designed to reflect
the actual partisan composition of the state, was sustained in Gaffney
v. Cummings.51 In limiting the scope of the Swann and Kilgarlin
rule, Gaffney established the existence of three classes of state legisla-
tive apportionment cases: (1) those with enormous variations such
as those striken down in Reynolds and Kilgarlin; (2) the Mahan-
type cases, in which deviations are sufficiently large to require state
justification, but which nonetheless are justifiable and legally sustain-
ble; and (3) those cases with variances so small that no prima facie
case is made out at all under the equal portection clause.52 The total
deviation of 9.9 percent from equality, which was sustained in the com-
panion case of White v. Regester,53 was found to be within this last
category; Justice White did "not consider [these] relatively minor
population deviations among state legislative districts to substantially
dilute the weight of individual votes in the larger districts so as to de-
prive individuals in these districts of fair and effective representa-
tion. 5
Local Governmental Apportionment
The question of whether the one person-one vote formula ap-
plied to local governmental units remained unanswered until 1968,
46. 410 U.S. at 320-21. The insertion of the word "only" into the phrasing of
the issue clearly seems to be contrary to the spirit of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964), and to the Court's interpretation of article I, section 2 in the congressional
districting cases. Wesberry v. Sanders, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1964).
47. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
48. 410 U.S. at 321
49. Id. at 325, quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
50. Id. at 327. This statement clearly runs counter to the strict judicial scrutiny
test in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
51. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
52. Id. at 744-45.
53. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). The Supreme Court also sustained the district court's
invalidatin of two "multi-member districts" which were part of Texas' mixed plan
since the lower court had made the necessary finding that members of minority groups
had "less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the politi-
cal processes and to elect legislators of their choice." Id. at 766.
54. Id. at 764.
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when the plaintiffs in Avery v. Midland County5" successfully chal-
lenged the election of members of the Midland County Commissioners
Court from four districts, one of which contained 95 percent of the
county's populace. In Avery, Justice White declared that the Reyn-
olds' principles "0 did apply to elections of "units of local government
having general governmental powers over -the entire geographic area
served by the body." 57  Two years later, in Hadley v. Junior College
District,"' the Avery doctrine was held to encompass the election of
local college trustees: "[A]s a general rule, whenever a state or local
government decides to select persons by popular election to perform
governmental functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal
opportunity to participate in that election, and when members of an
elected body are chosen from separate districts, each district must be
established on a basis that will insure, as far as is practicable, that
equal numbers of voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers
of officials." 5
The outer limit of permissible deviation in local elections was the
subject of dispute in Abate v. Mundt.60 The suit attacked an appor-
55. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
56. For a description of the Reynolds' test, see note 31 supra & text accompany-
ing notes 28-31 supra.
57. 390 U.S. at 485. Avery is an interesting decision for two reasons. First, in
four previous cases, the Court had indicated that it wished to wait for an ideal context
to finally decide Reynolds' applicability to local government. Moody v. Flowers, 387
U.S. 97 (1967); Board of Supervisors v. Bianchi, 387 U.S. 97 (1967); Sailors v. Board
of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967); Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967). Avery did not
meet any of the criteria of a perfect case. The Commissioners Court dealt almost ex-
clusively with the problems of the rural areas; application of the "equal population"
mandate would deny the rural areas virtually all representation. Yet this is exactly
what the Court did. 'The contrast between the delicate treatment of 1967 and the
heavy-handed approach of 1968 was almost breath-taking. It was as though the Court
had carefully tiptoed throughout the silent house and then knocked over the lamp while
closing the door." Sentell, Avery v. Midland County: Reapportionment and Local
Government Revisted, 3 GA. L. Rnv. 110, 120 (1968). Furthermore, the Court re-
buked the Avery litigants for extensively arguing the legislative versus administrative
character of the Commissioners Court. Yet this very point had been a decisive factor
in sustaining the constitutionality of an electoral scheme in Sailors v. Board of Educ.,
387 U.S. 105 (1967).
58. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
59. Id. at 56. In Hadley, the Court approved the statement in Sailors v. Board
of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967), that "[vliable local governments may need many inno-
vations, numerous combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal
arrangements to meet changing urban conditions. We see nothing in the Constitution
to prevent experimentation." 397 U.S. at 59, quoting Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387
U.S. 105, 110 (1967). However, great flexibility is difficult to reconcile with the
Court's single-minded emphasis on "equal representation for equal numbers."
60. 403 U.S. 182 (1971). The county legislature was elected proportionately
from the county's five constituent towns. As a result of this governmental structure,
tionment plan for electing the eighteen members of a county legisla-
ture from five districts, having -a total deviation of 11.9 percent from
equality. 6 Although the scheme was sustained, Justice Marshall, writ-
ing for -the Court, emphasized that the decision was based both upon
the long tradition of overlapping functions and personnel in the coun-
ty's government and upon the absence of a built-in bias tending to
favor particular political interests or geographic areas.
62
The Supreme Court Decisions Analyzed
The preceding discussion illustrates the Court's confusion in re-
solving the reapportionment problem. In the congressional districting
decisions the Court has staunchly adhered to its preoccupation with
strict mathematical equality, while in the state legislative apportion-
ment cases, it apparently permits a greater degree of variation from
equal-population districts. Even greater deviations are permitted in
local governmental elections, despite the fact that, due to the smaller
numbers of voters involved, even a small deviation may have a great
effect upon a voter's ability to affect the election's outcome.
The following analysis will consider three specific problems en-
countered in the reapportionment decisions. First, it will consider
the significance of the Court's characterization of these cases as civil
rights cases. Second, this discussion will examine the proposition that
the Court has created multiple constitutional standards for reviewing
reapportionment litigation. Finally, it will consider the problems in-
volved in using a one person-one vote formula as the standard for
judging the constitutionality of electoral schemes.
A Personal Right versus Group Interests
The logic of the reapportionment decisions of June, 1964, is simple
and straightforward. The Court, pursuing its long and in the main
quite proper romance with egalitarianism . . . defined all of the
difficult problems out of existence. In regard to reapportionment,
as in regard to race, equal protection is to be a constitutional ab-
solute, in this instance virtually a mathematical absolute. The
Court focused on two things, and two things only: one was bare
population, with all political allegiances and group interests elimi-
nated; the other was the individual voter, viewed only as a faceless
census statistic, and the voter's supposed right to an abstract math-
matically 'equal' vote.
In short, the Court does not view these cases as representa-
tion cases, or as representative democracy cases at all. It views
the county and town governments worked closely together to provide the necessary pub-
lic services.
61. For explanation of this percentage formula, see note 23 supra.
62. 403 U.S. at 187.
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them as being simply one more round of civil rights cases-but
its supposed 'civil right of voters' is really only a 'civil right of cen-
sus statistics.' 63
Because of the mischaracterization of the reapportionment de-
cisions as "right to vote" cases, 64 the Supreme Court, in Reynolds,
found that the rights which were being protected were "individual and
personal in nature." 5  Thus, it seems that group interests are not
relevant factors in designing an apportionment scheme. Paradoxi-
cally, however, the Reynolds decision itself relied heavily upon -the
concept of fair and effective representation, which necessarily incorpo-
rates interest-group considerations.6 6  Justice Fortas, dissenting in
Fortson v. Morris,67 recognized this inconsistency and the importance
of interest groups in our political processes:
It is not merely the casting of the vote or its mechanical counting
that is protected by the Constitution. It is the function-the of-
fice-the effect given to the vote, that is protected.
A vote is not an object of art. It is the sacred and most
important instrument of democracy and of freedom. In simple
terms, the vote is meaningless-it no longer serves the purpose of
the democratic society-unless it, taken in the aggregate with the
votes of other citizens, results in effecting the will of those citi-
zens. .... 68
This mischaracterization of the right to vote as a personal civil
right was a primary factor leading the Court to resolve the reap-
portionment problem with the one person-one vote formula. The re-
sult has been a preoccupation with numbers, ignoring the most im-
portant aspect of the right, the quality of the voter's representation.69
63. Dixon, supra note 26, at 320. The June 1964 reapportionment decisions to
which Dixon refers are: Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lo-
menzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis
v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v.
Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
64. See note 89 infra & text accompanying notes 89-92 infra.
65. 377 U.S. at 561.
66. Representation is an interest group concept. It is impossible for elected gov-
ernmental bodies to consider the wishes and demands of each individual constituent in
their decision-making. Rather, it is the voices of interest groups and political parties,
"the building blocks of political power", which affect the judgment of the elected offi-
cials. See Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitu-
tional Struggle foi Fair Representation, 63 MicH. L. Rnv. 209, 218 (1964).
67. 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
68. Id. at 250.
69. For example, the one person-one vote cannot cure the evils of gerrymander-
ing, which has a tremendous impact upon the effectiveness of a vote. In order to deal
with gerrymandering, interest-group affiliations must be considered. See notes 97-99
& accompanying text infra.
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Different Constitutional Standards?
We may have only one 'one man-one vote' principle, but it may
turn out to have more variety than Gertrude Stein's roses. 70
Not all legislative classifications are forbidden by the equal pro-
tection clause. The Court's approach to equal protection has been de-
pendent upon the importance of the right to equality asserted. If
the right is "fundamental," such as race or religion, the classification
has been termed "suspect," and the Court's weighing of the interests
of the individual and of the government has leaned heavily in favor
of maximizing the individual's rights;71 less important rights, especially
those in the economic realm, are afforded less protection.7 2
Because the "right to vote" is a basic civil right of man,73 any
classification of voters which infringes upon this right is suspect and
thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny." The one person-one vote
principle--"an honest and good faith effort to construct districts . . .
as nearly of equal population as is practicable" 75-was the. Court's
selection of the scale for weighing the interests in the reapportionment
cases. However, the "as nearly as practicable" test has not been uni-
formly applied; rather, its interpretation has depended upon whether
the apportionment scheme was aimed at the congressional, state leg-
islative, or local governmental level.
For example, in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,76 a congressional dis-
tricting case, Justice Brennan rejected "Missouri's argument that there
is a fixed numerical or percentage population variance small enough
to be considered de minimus and to satisfy without question the 'as
nearly as practicable' standard. The whole thrust of the 'as nearly as
practicable' approach is inconsistent with adoption of fixed numerical
standards which excuse population variances without regard to the
circumstances of each particular case."77  It is difficult to understand
how the "as nearly as practicable" approach is any more consistent
with fixed standards in the realm of state legislative districting. Yet,
in Gaffney v. Cummings,7 8 the Court declared without reservation that
"minor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative
districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious
70. Dixon, Local Representation: Constitutional Mandates and Apportionment
Opinions, 36 GEo. WASH. L. Rn'v. 693, 704 (1968).
71. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
72. See, e.g., Lindlsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
73. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964).
74. Id. at 562.
75. Id. at 577.
76. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
77. Id. at 530 (emphasis added).
78. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
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discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justi-
fication by the State.""0  Apparently, as great a variance as 9.9 per-
cent is a minor deviation. 0
Justice Brennan, concurring in part in Mahan v. Howell,"' ex-
pressed his concern with this illogical approach. Prior to Mahan the
Court had never held that different constitutional standards were ap-
plicable to the various reapportionment situations. There are con-
cededly differences, even between congressional and legislative ap-
portionment which the Court had recognized, but this recognition was
"hardly tantamount to the establishment of -two distinct controlling
standards.""2
While the State may have a broader range of interests to which
it can point in attempting to justify a failure to achieve precise
equality in the context of legislature apportionment, it by no
means follows that the State is subject to a lighter burden of proof
or that the controlling constitutional standard is in any sense dis-
tinguishable.83
The Supreme Court has failed thus far -to explain this discrepancy,
apparently recognizing the existence of only one constitutional standard
which may, however, be tempered by considerations of the relevancy
of various state interests to the level of government involved. It has
also failed to explain another inconsistency in these cases. In Reynolds
v. Sims, Justice Warren refused to consider group interests, respect for
political boundaries, or history alone as a valid consideration in design-
ing apportionment schemes."4 Yet, in Gaffney v. Cummings, 5 the
Court permitted conscious allocation of political power to interest
groups (political parties). In Mahan v. Howell,s0 the Court sustained
Virginia's state legislative apportionment scheme despite the state's justi-
fication of respecting political boundaries. Then, in Abate v. Mundt,8 7
an historical justification was sustained.
Thus, the reapportionment cases have not been reviewed under
one constitutional standard. Rather, it seems that the inadequacies
of the one person-one vote formula have been compounded by the
need to mitigate the rule's rigidity, and the Court has been forced to
stretch one person-one vote to the point where it has given rise to sev-
eral constitutional balancing tests.
79. Id. at 745.
80. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 757 (1973).
81. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
82. Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
83. Id.
84. 377 U.S. 533, 580-81 (1964).
85. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
86. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
87. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
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One Person-One Vote versus Fair and Effective Representation
"Despite all of the cases the Court has decided-involving almost
every state-the one man, one vote principle will never be much more
than a good slogan." 88  One reason for this is the Court's miscon-
ception that the apportionment cases are "right to vote" cases.
In Reynolds the Supreme Court described the right to vote as "a
fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights." '89 Al-
though the Court did not cite the origin of a constitutional right to
vote, Professor Kauper suggests that its source must be either the "sub-
stantive rights" interpretation of the due process clause or the "guar-
antee of a republican form of government" clause of article IV.9"
Simply assuming the existence of such a right, the Court proceeded
to classify the reapportionment cases as "right to vote" cases. How-
ever, as both Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart have recognized, no
one's right to vote has been denied or restricted, and nobody has been
deprived of the right to have his voted counted.91 Rather, "[the voting
cases] are representation cases, i.e., they are cases concerning the most
interesting, the most complex, the most baffling aspect of public feel-
ing on innumerable public policy issues through the medium of peri-
odic, partisan selection of district delegates to a multi-membered rep-
resentative assembly."'92
The fact that a right to vote is not involved is also evidenced by
the Court's emphasis on number of total residents9 3 and on census
88. Clark, Introduction to Symposium-One Man-One Vote and Local Govern-
ment, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 689, 690-91 (1968).
89. 377 U.S. at 562, quoting Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
90. Kauper, Some Comments on the Reapportionment Cases, 63 MICH. L. REv.
243, 249 (1964). In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting
in part), Justice Douglas cited article I, section 2 and the Fifteenth and Seventeenth
Amendments to support his statement that "[tihe right to vote is a civil right deeply
embedded in the Constitution." Id. at 138.
91. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Lucas
v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 744 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
92. Dixon, supra note 26, at 319.
93. The percentages and ratios considered by the Supreme Court in the reappor-
tionment cases are based on total population as reflected by the last census. Justice
White, in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), discussed the difficulty with
the Court's emphasis on total population. "[I]t must be recognized that total popula-
tion, even if absolutely accurate as to each district when taken, is nevertheless not a
talismanic measure of the weight of a person's vote under a later adopted apportionment
plan. The United States census is more of an event than a process. It measures popu-
lation at only a single instant in time. District populations are constantly changing,
often at different rates in either direction, up or down. Substantial differentials in pop-
ulation growth rates are striking and well-known phenomena. So too, if it is the
weight of a person's vote that matters, total population-even if stable and accurately
taken-may not accurately reflect that body of voters whose votes must be counted and
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figures9 4 rather than on voting population. Census figures are only
rough approximations of the relative numbers of voters in each elec-
tion; they do not reflect the substantial variation between districts of
persons not qualified to vote because of age, nonregistration, or other
factors. It is only if the number of valid ballots95 in every district is
identical that the "right of a citizen to equal representation and to have
his vote weighted equally with those of all other citizens in the elec-
tion"' 96 is at all meaningful.
Even if districts having identical numbers of actual voters are
created, fair and effective representation may still be an elusive ideal.
The one person-one vote concept is completely incapable of deterring
either intentional or unintentional gerrymandering. Because group
interests, including partisanship, are not evenly distributed throughout
a state, a city, or other electoral unit,9" overrepresentation and under-
representation of these interests is a necessary consequence of almost
any districting arrangement. 98 If a voter lives in a district having many
other persons belonging to the same interest group, his vote and his
representation will be important; if the voter's interest group has little
support in the district, his vote will have an insubstantial impact upon
the election's outcome, despite his interest group's overall strength in
the electoral unit. In addition, even if interest group affiliations are
evenly distributed throughout an electoral unit, the districts can be
gerrymandered to control each group's voting power. For example,
in a state having a ratio of sixty Democrats to forty Republicans, dis-
tricts can be drawn so that each has exactly this partisan composition,
precluding the election of any Republicans. Hence, contrary to the
"basic principle of representative government," 99 the weight of a citi-
zen's vote will usually depend upon where he lives. 100
weighed for the purposes of reapportionment, because 'census persons' are not voters.
The proportion of the census population too young to vote or disqualified by alienage
or nonresidence varies substantially among the States and among localities within the
States." Id. at 746-47.
94. See note 93 supra.
95. See note 124 infra.
96. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964) (emphasis added).
97. In other words, the ratio of urban to rural inhabitants, democrats to republi-
cans, and blacks to whites, etc. varies considerably from district to district.
98. In other words, the chance that the interest group composition of any two
districts is the same is very remote. It would be a virtual impossibility for the com-
position of all the districts to be exactly the same. Therefore, overrepresentation and
underrepresentation of these interest groups is, for all practical purposes, a mathemati-
cal certainty in any districting arrangement
99. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
100. For a further discussion of the effect of residence on voting power, see text
accompanying note 117 infra.
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Thirdly, "equal representation for equal numbers" may create
greater injustices than it discourages. For example, suppose a county
containing fewer than 10 percent rural inhabitants has created a gov-
ernmental body whose function is almost exclusively limited to the
resolution of rural problems. If the one person-one vote standard were
applied, it is doubtful whether the rural residents could obtain any
representation on the local governmental board. Yet, this is precisely
the factual setting of Avery v. Midland County,10 1 the first decision in
which the Supreme Court subjected local government elections to the
standard of one person-one vote.
Thus, the Court's one person-one vote formula has generated at
least as many problems as it has resolved. A new approach to the
reapportionment issue is urgently needed if a citizen's right to fair and
effective representation is to receive adequate protection.
A Solution
Many of the reapportionment cases contain language supporting
a constitutional right to fair and effective representation,'0 2 which like
the right to vote presumably arises either from the "guarantee"
clause of article IV or from the "substantive civil rights" interpretation
of the due process clause. 103 Reynolds itself recognized that "the
achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is con-
cededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment . ". .., If this
is the ultimate goal, as it should be, then a judicial standard must be
designed which will effectuate this ideal. It seems self-evident that the
proper standard should be fair and effective representation itself. This
test not only ensures that each voter's vote is valued equally, irrespec-
tive of his place of residence, but also allows flexibility in factual situ-
ations such as that in Avery." 5
Fair and effective representation defies precise definition. Gen-
erally, to sustain a "multi-member" electoral scheme under this stan-
dard, a court would require that the inherent rules of the system,
verified by the results, ensure an accurate reflection of the electorate
in the governing body. As to single-office elections, the intrinsic rules
of an electoral system must guarantee that the winner is supported by
at least fifty percent of the voters.
101. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
102. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 743 (1973); White v. Weiser,
412 U.S. 783, 788 (1973).
103. See note 90 & accompanying text supra.
104. 377 U.S. at 565-66.
105. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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Unconstitutionality of Bloc Voting and
Plurality Voting Systems
The Supreme Court has attempted to fit the first-past-the-post
systems into a framework of one person-one vote. Their endeavor,
however, has not succeeded and for an obvious reason: the two con-
cepts are incompatible. The winner-take-all aspect of these electoral
systems advances neither the cause of one person-one vote, nor of fair
and effective representation.
Both bloc voting and plurality voting systems are constitutionally
suspect when weighed against the goal (or standard) of fair and ef-
fective representation. This section will discuss some of the constitu-
tional difficulties with these electoral systems. Although the analysis
will concentrate upon the defects of the systems applied on a city level,
the arguments are equally valid for other electoral levels.
Bloc Voting System
Bloc voting, the multi-member first-past-the-post system, not
only fails to effectuate fair and effective representation, but also re-
sults in invidious discrimination, which ,the equal protection clause pro-
hibits.
As Justice Douglas stated in his dissent in Wright v. Rockefel-
ler,106 "[a] well-settled proposition applicable -to many rights in the
constitutional spectrum is -that there may be an abridgement 'even
though unintended'. . . . What the State has done is often conclusive
irrespective of motive."'11 7 Therefore, regardless of the motivation for
utilizing a bloc voting system, if such a system denies substantial in-
terest groups their fair representation, the system is invidiously dis-
criminatory and violative of the equal protection clause.
Bloc voting may perpetuate minority domination of an elective
body. When the electorate has aligned itself into several distinct
groups, a well-organized group may elect as many as 100 percent of
the seats. This result is most apparent when, for example, one group
runs many candidates. The group's votes may splinter among the
many candidates, permitting a smaller, better-organized group to be
grossly overrepresented. Such a result is clearly contrary to the Su-
preme Court's declaration that "in a society ostensibly grounded on
representative government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of
the people of a State could elect a majority of that State's legislators
[so as to produce a body] which [is] collectively responsive to the popu-
lar wil."'1 0 8
106. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
107. Id. at 61-62 (Douglas, I., dissenting).
108. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
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Bloc voting frequently forces a voter either to vote against a
candidate of his choice, or to risk the possibility of defeating his fav-
orite candidate. For example, suppose City X elects the five members
of its city council with a bloc voting system. A, a voter, decides that
candidate M will best represent his interests on the council. If he
votes only for M, he has utilized only one of the five votes to which
he is entitled. However, if he does cast votes for other candidates as
well, he is helping these others to accrue votes and possibly to defeat
his favorite candidate. Such a forced dilemma is clearly contrary to
the "right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion [which]
is a bedrock of our political system."' 10 9
In Whitcomb v. Chavis," ° the Supreme Court summarized its
position on bloc voting systems. They noted that the cases concerning
the constitutional validity of "multi-member districts" have focused
not on population-based apportionment but on the quality of repre-
sentation afforded by the multi-member district as compared with single
member districts."' The Court's reluctance to analyze "multi-mem-
ber districts," beyond simply comparing them to "single-member dis-
tricts," is further evidence of its simplistic approach to reapportion-
ment problems. These systems are clearly suspect under either a fair
and effective representation standard, or the Court's own concept of
one person-one vote. Since the inherent rules of bloc voting work to
distort representation, it will be a rare occasion, and probably an ac-
cident, that a bloc voting election does not violate the Constitution.
Furthermore, the voting power 12 of interest groups can also be dis-
torted through gerrymandering or allocation of representatives by a
simple ratio when bloc voting is used in a district which is part of a
mixed districting arrangement."3 The Court has not yet confronted
these arguments, and a direct attack on bloc voting may force the
Court to come to grips with these essential questions.
109. Id. at 562.
110. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
111. Id. at 142.
112. Voting power is defined as "the relative ability of each member [of the elec-
torate] to affect the outcome of the group's decisions through his vote." Banzhaf,
Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Prin-
ciple, 75 YALE L.J. 1309, 1315 (1966).
113. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), the Court considered Banzhaf's
mathematical theory that such allocation distorts representation, but erroneously dis-
missed the argument because it "knowingly avoids and does 'not take into account any
political or other factors which might affect the actual voting power of the residents.
1 . Id. at 145-46. But see Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do They
Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALEI L.J. 1309, 1310-11 (1966), for
a persuasive rebuttal to the Court's argument.
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Plurality Voting-Singly and Districting
Plurality voting may be used in either of two situations: as part
of a larger apportionment system, i.e., as a traditional single-member
districting system; or alone, in electing a one-seat office, such as in a
mayoral race. In both situations, fair and effective representation may
be substantially thwarted.
In a two-candidate single-seat election, no problem is presented:
one of the candidates must achieve a majority of the votes. However,
when more than two candidates vie for the office, the winner frequently
accrues only a plurality of the votes. Thus, contrary to the Court's
desire for majority rule,114 this winner-take-all system often operates to
distort grossly minority representation and to waste the votes of a
majority of the electorate.
The plurality system in a single-office election may also infringe
upon a voter's right freely to select a candidate of his choice, a neces-
sary element of a meaningful election in a representative democracy.115
For example, a voter is often caught in the quandry of deciding
whether to vote against a major contender by voting for the other
major candidate, or to vote for a wild card candidate whom he feels
will more closely represent his views. If he follows the latter course
of action, he may assure the election of his least favorite candidate;
however, if he selects the former course, he has not voted for the
candidate of his choice.
When used as part of a districting system, plurality voting is sub-
ject to gerrymandering. Even if the districts are composed of equal
populations, there is an infinite number of possible ways to construct
the districts, including many which would achieve any desired overre-
presentation and underrepresentation. "When such is the case, the
surgeon's scalpel replaces the butcher's cleaver, yet with approximately
the same results." ' 6
Plurality voting in combination with a districting system may tend
to encourage the maintenance of ghetto areas. If a voter resides in an
area which is also inhabited by others belonging to his interest group,
such as a black ghetto, his vote has meaning; he can have his choice
reflected in the governing body. On the other hand, if he moves into
a predominantly white neighborhood, 'his vote is transformed into one
of the many that are "wasted." The value of his vote therefore varies
according to his residence. Such a result was expressly forbidden by
the Reynolds' Court when it declared that "the basic principle of rep-
114. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
115. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
116. Editorial note, Political Gerrymandering: The Law and Politics of Partisan
Districting, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 144, 146 (1967).
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resentative government remains, and must remain, unchanged-the
weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on where he
lives."" 
7
The Alternative: Fair and Effective
Representation Ensured
The proportional representation (P.R.) system of single transfer-
able vote (S.T.V.)" 8 was invented and popularized by Thomas Hare
in 1857.119 Many countries utilize P.R. systems and several United
States cities have experimented with S.T.V. 120  The S.T.V. system has
been justifiably criticized and its constitutionality challenged in several
states.121  The major objections, however, have been overcome in a
newly-developed form of P.R., called P.P.R.-preferential proportional
representation with fractional transfer of surplus votes.
Mechanics
A P.P.R. election, for all practical purposes, must be computer-
ized. It is a multi-member district system but is easily adopted to a
single-office election.'22  Each voter is instructed to mark his ballot
preferentially, designating his first preference candidate with a "1,"
his second choice with a "2," etc., until he has no further prefer-
ences.' 23 The ballots are then fed into a computer, and the outcome
is tabulated as follows:
117. 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
118. See note 8 supra.
119. It had also been "invented" independently two years earlier by Andrae in
Denmark. Ross, supra note 3, at 101.
120. For applications of various electoral systems, see Ross, supra note 3, at 234
(Appendix I). See id. at 240 (Appendix II) for examples of elections under P.R. sys-
tems.
121. For a discussion and enumeration of the constitutionality suits, see Deep in
the Thicket, supra note 4, at 1119 n.272. In People ex rel. Devine v. Elkus, 59 Cal.
App. 396, 211 P. 34 (1922), a California court held an S.T.V. system used in Sacra-
mento unconstitutional under the California Constitution, declaring that "[tihe right
to vote 'at all elections' includes the right to vote for a candidate for every office to
be filled and on every proposition submitted." Id. at 398-99, 211 P. at 35. However,
the precedential value of this case is highly questionable. First, the decision is over
fifty years old, rendered far before the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the right
to vote. Second, the clause in the constitution on which the case relied was deleted
in 1972 when article II was extensively rewritten. Article II, § 3 (1972); article II,
§ 1 (1879). Third, if the right to vote includes the right to fair and effective represen-
tation, as the Supreme Court declared in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964),
then the technicality of voting for each seat open should give way to the right to fair
and effective representation. The right to vote loses much of its meaning if the right
to representation is not protected.
122. See text following note 126 infra.
123. Although a limit on the maximum number of preferences may be established,
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1. A quota is determined according to the formula:
the number of valid ballots124 cast +t1.
the number of seats open + 1
This quota, which is analogous to a majority, both represents the least
number of votes needed to be elected and is a number sufficient to pre-
clude the election of too many candidates. For example, if 10,000
ballots are cast and there are four seats open for election, the quota
is 2001; if it were 2000, five candidates could possibly be elected.
2. In round one, the first preferences only are tallied for each
candidate. If any candidate reaches or exceeds the quota, he is de-
clared elected.
3. If, in thei first (or any subsequent round), 'a candidate is
elected, a transfer value for that candidate is figured by the formula:
1-the quota . The transfer value represents the
the number of votes received
proportion of each voter's vote which has not helped to elect the candi-
date. For example, if a candidate accrues 4002 votes, with a quota of
2001 votes, the transfer value is .5; if the candidate accumulates 2002
2001
votes, the transfer value is the decimal equilavent of 1 - .2002
4. The unused fraction of a vote calculated -above is then trans-
ferred to the next valid preference of each of these voters. If any
candidate reaches or exceeds the quota at this time, he is elected and
the process is repeated. For example, if a voter's first preference is
candidate M, who was elected in Round 1 with a transfer value of
.5, and his second choice was candidate N who was victorious in
Round 2 (or any subsequent round) with a transfer value of .1, then
candidate 0, the voter's third preference, receives .05 votes, the un-
used portion of the voter's vote.125
the system works most ideally without any limit. The following are suggested rules
for dealing with two or more equal preferences or skipped preferences: if a voter des-
ignates two or more candidates as the same preference, this preference shall be con-
sidered as a skipped preference; if a voter skips a preference-for example, does not
designate any candidate as a second preference-the vote is simply transferred to the
next preference at present value.
124. Only valid ballots should be tabulated. An example of an invalid ballot in
a P.P.R. election is one in which all of the candidates designated are marked as first
preferences, since it is not possible to determine the voter's true order of preference;
this defect can be cured by simply assigning a fraction of a vote, equal to 1 divided
by the number of candidates designated, to each candidate for whom the voter voted.
125. It should be noted that, in P.P.R., "votes" do not mean the same as "ballots."
Each voter casts one ballot and is permitted only one vote. However, as shown by
subheadings "3." and "4." in the text, although the vote may splinter, it will always
cumulatively be worth "1." Therefore, in any given round of the election, since ballots
are always counted as whole numbers and votes are often expressed in decimal frac-
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5. If, in any round, no candidate reaches or exceeds the quota,
the candidate with the least number of votes at that point is deleted,
and the "unused" part of each voter's vote (i.e., unused in that it
helped elect no candidate) is transferred at its present value to the
next preference.
6. This process of election, deletion, and transference is con-
tinued until either a sufficient number of candidates has been elected
or the number of candidates remaining in contention equals the num-
ber of seats unfilled. The latter event occurs because some voters do
not select a sufficient number of preferences; thus, their ballot be-
comes exhausted." 6
P.P.R. may be analogized to a shopper's excursion into a super-
market. The shopper wishes to purchase some apples, but the store
has run out of this item. His second preference, peaches, is also out
of stock. However, strawberries, his third choice, are available-and
on sale. Thus, the shopper has enough money remaining to buy the
strawberries and also to purchase some blackberries.
An analogous system, the "Alternative Vote System," may be
utilized in single-seat elections. As in P.P.R., the voter marks his
ballot preferentially. The quota becomes a simple majority:
the number of valid ballots cast
-1- 1. If no candidate reaches or exceeds the
2
quota in round 1, the candidate with the least number of votes is
deleted, and his votes are transferred. This process is continued until
the office has been filled.
P.P.R. ensures accurate reflection of the strength of each interest
group in the governing body, regardless of the number of candidates
from each interest group seeking election and regardless of how the
votes split among the candidates; if one candidate receives a large
quotient of votes, the surplus is transferred to other candidates. If
the support of an interest group splits widely among its candidates,
the votes will eventually concentrate in one or more of its candidates,
tions, the number of ballots accrued by any candidate will usually exceed the number
of votes he has accrued. (The number of ballots accrued by each candidate may be
printed out on the computer print-out; however, this figure is not necessary to deter-
mine the outcome of the election.) If the transfer value of candidate M were .5, and
that of candidate N were .1, the voter would use one half of his vote to elect his first
preference. One half of the vote would then transfer to his second preference; only one
tenth (i.e., N's transfer value) of the half vote, or .05 of a vote, therefore remains
to be given to the voter's third preference. The sum of the used votes, .5 (for his
first preference), .45 (used to elect his second preference) and .05 (presently being
used by his third preference), is 1.
126. This occurrence may be alleviated by utilizing a diminishing quota, which di-
minishes the number of valid ballots used in the quota formula as ballots become ex-
hausted.
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depending upon the group's strength in the electorate. Of course, a
voter need not vote for candidates representing the same interest group,
but may vote according to any criteria he desires. There is no fear
that any part of the vote will be wasted,127 for if the candidate does
not need the vote (either because he is elected or deleted) it will be
transferred to the next preference.
There is no doubt -that P.P.R. can withstand strict judicial scru-
tiny, as it guarantees fair and effective representation. Admittedly,
however, it is not perfect. Computerization of the voting process
frightens some people and may present some technological obstacles.
The primary objection to P.P.R., however, is that it is mechanically
too complicated for some voters to understand. However, just as an
automobile driver need not comprehend the engine's intricacies in or-
der to propel the vehicle, so a voter can confidently vote in a P.P.R.
election without comprehending all of the details. Indeed, many
"complex" P.R. systems are used in countries with higher illiteracy
rates than that in the United States.128
Conclusion
Having opened the floodgates of electoral litigation in Baker v.
Carr,"29 the Supreme Court has found itself caught in the onrushing
waters of a complex struggle for representation. Unfortunately, the
Court has resorted to a simplistic, arithmetic approach to resolve the
reapportionment conflict and has employed several different constitu-
tional standards to protect one constitutional right.
First-past-the-post electoral systems, including 'bloc voting and
plurality voting, are, at -the very least, constitutionally suspect when
objectively analyzed; simply comparing these systems to each other, as
the Court has done, will neither expose their true nature nor ever re-
solve the larger representation issues. Having laid the -foundation in
Reynolds v. Sims,' 3  the Court should acknowledge the substantive
meaning of the right to fair and effective representation and, using
this as its standard, proceed objectively to evaluate bloc voting and
plurality voting.
127. This is not absolute true. In the final round, the preferences for the last
candidate deleted are technically "wasted" since they do not transfer and hence do not
help to elect a candidate. But the number of wasted votes in a P.P.R. election will
rarely exceed a few percent, which is a vast improvement upon other systems.
128. For an excellent analysis of the comparative merits and defects of all three
types of electoral systems (not including P.P.R. however), see generally Ross, supra
note 3.
129. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
130. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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P.P.R.-preferential proportional representation with fractional
transfer of surplus votes-is the most democratic electoral system yet
devised, and may be applied to all elections. However, other systems
undoubtedly exist, or can be invented, which can meet a fair and ef-
fective representation standard. The extraordinary problems foreseen
when the Court rendered its decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion-13 did not deter the Court there from ruling that segregation in
education offended the equal protection clause; it is time for the Su-
preme Court to provide similar firm guidance in the area of voting
and representation.
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